Intelligence and Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee Mark Summary for H.R.2500 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020

Jun 3, 2019 Issues: Armed Services

WASHINGTON – Led by Chairman Jim Langevin (D-RI) and Ranking Member Elise Stefanik (R-NY), the Committee on Armed Services Subcommittee on Intelligence and Emerging Threats and Capabilities today released their proposals for the Fiscal Year 2020 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). The Subcommittee will meet at 11 a.m. on Tuesday, June 4 in Rayburn 2118. The markup will be live streamed on the committee’s website. The Subcommittee's mark is available here.

Specifically, this year's proposal:

  • Provides for a comprehensive and robust S&T and R&D ecosystem to maintain a technological edge
    • Requires an assessment of the current workforce essential STEM skillsets required to support emerging and future warfighter technologies, including an analysis of the recruiting, retention, and representation of minorities and women in the current and projected workforce and strategy for diversification of the workforce.
    • Directs the Secretary to develop and implement a strategy for fifth generation (5G) information and communications technologies and recommends additional investment.
    • Directs the Secretary of Defense to establish a process to ensure that the policies of the Department relating to emerging technology are formulated and updated continuously as such technology is developed by the Department to provide for sound capability investment and expedited employment to the warfighter consistent with such policies.
    • Recommends increases in manufacturing technology programs, additive manufacturing technology programs, and university research initiatives across the services and Department.
    • Directs the Director, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation to conduct a study and provide a briefing on the effects of the Department submitting future budget requests with negative real growth in the Department’s funding for S&T efforts to understand the impact of this historic underfunding of the U.S. technological edge.
    • Extends the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence to allow adequate time in support of critical national security objectives.
  • Enhances protection of critical technology
    • Requires a report and clarification of roles and responsibilities relating to cybersecurity in the Defense Industrial Base to ensure cohesion and effectiveness across the Department.
    • Directs regular reports to the committee from the Protecting Critical Technologies Task Force.
    • Recommends additional funding to convening a National Science, Technology, and Security Roundtable through the National Academies of Science, Engineering and Medicine in order to facilitate dialogue and formulate solutions related to protecting U.S. critical technology and national security information while simultaneously preserving civil liberties and an open science and technology research environment. 
    • Directs a briefing on the Department’s Trusted Microelectronics strategy, including an assessment of supplier base capacity and how 5G information infrastructure and interconnected devices are changing the national security and commercial marketplace for trusted microelectronics.
    • Directs the Comptroller General of the United States to assess the Department’s electronic warfare and electromagnetic spectrum operations strategy and implementation efforts to include the current electronic warfare threat from peer or near-peer adversaries and actions the Department has taken in response to include the protection of critical warfighting capabilities.
  • Strengthens oversight of military operations, cyber operations and enhances cybersecurity
    • Requires notices by the Department to Congress for delegations of authorities from the President to the Secretary of Defense for operations in cyberspace.
    • Bolsters reporting of sensitive military operations in cyberspace by defining such operations and thresholds for notices.
    • Limits funding until a Tier One cyber exercise is conducted to promote preparedness for such event in the United States.
    • Extends the Cyberspace Solarium Commission’s report due date by one year, allowing the Commission adequate time to complete its imperative objective to develop a consensus on a strategic, whole-of-government approach in the defense of significant cyber-attacks against the United States.
    • Mandates a report upon completion of the evaluation of cyber vulnerabilities for each major U.S. advanced weapon system to include mitigation strategies to address or prevent these vulnerabilities through premeditated adjustments to the research, development, and acquisition cycle.
  • Supports Special Operations Force (SOF) Readiness and Alignment to the National Defense Strategy and National Military Strategy
    • Directs the Secretary to enter into an agreement with a Federally Funded Research and Development Center for purposes of an independent assessment of special operations forces (SOF) force structure and roles and responsibilities.
    • Requires fidelity on the amounts requested in the budget request in future years across the Department for support of SOF to understand the true cost of the force.
    • Provides additional funding for SOF suicide prevention.
    • Requires GAO to review to current organizational structures of Geographic Combatant Commands and Theater Special Operations Command to ensure adequate alignment to concise and measurable objectives in the area of operations.
    • Continues focus on professionalism and ethics of the force through continued reporting.
  • Improves alignment of intelligence and security capabilities and activities to Department operational requirements and strategic priorities outlined in the National Defense Strategy
    • Requires a review and report on the organization, posture, and processes of intelligence collections capabilities and activities, for the purpose of assessing the ability of the intelligence collections capabilities and activities to support the current and future requirements of the Department of Defense.
    • Recognizes the critical nature of understanding emerging capabilities and requires a review of investments in scientific and technical intelligence.
    • Recognizes the importance of intelligence contributions of allies and partners.
    • Directs the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence to provide a briefing on the transition of the background investigations function from the Office of Personnel Management to the Department.